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ABSTRACT 
CAYLA CARDAMONE: Outcomes of FDI in Mississippi: The Cases of Nissan and 
Toyota (Under the direction of Dr. Milorad Novicevic) 
 
My original motivation for selecting this topic for my Croft thesis was to examine 
an issue that is of community relevance in Mississippi and could reveal how multiple 
global regions intersect and affect the quality of life in Mississippi. Guided by this 
motivation, I decided to examine whether the expected effects of Japanese FDI projects 
in Mississippi have been achieved in terms of job creation relative to both job quantity 
and job quality. My particular analytical focus has been on the job-creation effects of the 
Nissan plant in Canton and the Toyota plant in Blue Springs. For my analysis, I used 
publically-available county level data that I sourced from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
with the objective of comparing the employment levels and average annual wages in the 
counties where the plants are located before and after their openings. I found that direct 
job creation from the plants was properly estimated, while indirect job creation was 
overestimated. This has contributed to a lower net employment effect than projected, 
although the two plants have created higher paying jobs in the counties where they are 
located. Other research has found that investment in human and physical capital is a more 
effective way of increasing employment than paying incentives to attract firms. 
Therefore, to ensure that future foreign direct investment creates stable, quality jobs, the 
Mississippi state government should balance its investments in education and 
infrastructure with incentives designed to attract foreign investments from diverse 
industries.   
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
Globalization of the United States’ economy, which is commonly believed to 
contribute to the significant loss of jobs performed by low-skilled labor through 
outsourcing, has become a widely-debated topic at both the national and state level. The 
debut peaked during the 2016 presidential campaign, when both Republican and 
Democratic candidates alike criticized free trade and outward foreign investment for their 
roles in diminishing United States manufacturing. In response, the government has 
recently undertaken protectionist actions, such as withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, with the goal of safeguarding jobs.  
The debate and withdrawal have overshadowed the relevance of Foreign Direct 
Investment, or FDI, as an alternative way to create jobs in the United States and increase 
employment, particularly within the manufacturing industry. Federal and state 
governments have been devising policies to attract FDI and contribute to the employment 
of high-skilled labor whose jobs will replace quantitatively and upgrade qualitatively 
those lost through outsourcing. In this thesis, I will assess the job creation affected 
through exemplary FDI cases of Nissan and Toyota in Mississippi. For this examination, 
I will adopt the International Monetary Fund’s definition of FDI as follows,  
“A category of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident in 
one economy (the direct investor) obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise 
resident in another economy (the direct investment enterprise). The lasting 
interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct 
investor and the direct investment enterprise, and a significant degree of influence 
by the investor on the management of the enterprise. A direct investment 
relationship is established when the direct investor has acquired 10 percent or 
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more of the ordinary shares or voting power of an enterprise abroad” (Carson, 6-
7). 
 
 
FDI in the United States 
FDI received new focus under the last federal administration with the creation of 
the federal organization SelectUSA that placed importance on FDI as a source of job 
creation. SelectUSA, which is “designed to market the U.S. to overseas investors while 
helping them navigate federal, state, and local regulations,” (Miller) hosts an annual 
summit where foreign business leaders network with federal and state government 
officials and development organizations with the goal of fostering new investments. This 
networking is supported by the SelectUSA website, which is designed to clarify federal 
rules and regulations and provides information to companies regarding the incentives 
offered by various local governments. By creating connections between new investors in 
the United States and local communities, “SelectUSA has facilitated more than $23 
billion in investment, creating and/or retaining tens of thousands of U.S. jobs” 
(SelectUSA).  
The United States has attracted more FDI than any other country in the world, 
primarily owing to its open market, relatively stable financial system and economy, and 
favorable investment climate. Specifically, FDI accounted for 23 percent of GDP in 2011 
(Kornecki 2), while cumulative FDI in the United States totaled $2.9 trillion in 2014, 
where new investments totaled $112 billion in 2014 alone. The United Kingdom is 
responsible for the largest percentage of cumulative FDI in the United States with 15 
percent, but Japan closely follows, with 13 percent through 2014. The remaining FDI in 
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the United States mainly comes from the Netherlands, Canada, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Switzerland, and France (Foreign, 1-3).  
FDI in the manufacturing industry, which accounts for the largest source of FDI 
in the United States, amounted to more than $1 trillion in 2014, or “more than one third 
of cumulative foreign direct investment.” Within the manufacturing sector, “the 
transportation equipment industry, comprised mostly of auto and auto parts 
manufacturing, amounted to $110 billion through 2014,” topped only by the 
manufacturing of chemicals. The manufacturing of motor vehicles accounted for more 
than $74 billion of cumulative manufacturing FDI in 2014, whereas the wholesale trade 
of motor vehicles accounted for another $60 billion of cumulative FDI in 2014 (6-
Appendix B).  
The Southeast Automotive Core, or SEAC region, is a hotbed for auto-
manufacturing FDI in the United States. The region, which includes Alabama, Georgia, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee, hosts eight of eleven “New Domestic” light 
vehicle assembly plants that have been constructed over the last twenty years. The term 
“New Domestic” refers to the multinational auto manufacturers that operate North 
American assembly plants, such as Toyota, Honda, Nissan, and Volkswagen (Jacobs, 
199). When these multinational corporations consider a new investment, they scrutinize 
factors such as availability of potential sites, manufacturing density, wage rates, 
unionization and right-to-work legislation, unemployment rates, transportation 
infrastructure, tax rates, and government-sponsored incentive packages (Coughlin, 677-
680). 
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The SEAC region’s success in attracting these large FDI projects can partly be 
attributed to low property and business taxes, infrastructure giveaways and incentive 
packages, right-to-work laws and nonunionized labor, combined with aggressive 
marketing tactics conducted by local and state governments (Jacobs, 200). Government 
officials in this region have intensely recruited auto-related FDI in the form of 
manufacturing plants with the goal to bring high-skilled jobs to their states, and thus 
compensate for the outsourcing or elimination of low-skilled textile and apparel 
manufacturing jobs lost over the past couple of decades. As the SEAC region is generally 
characterized by low household and per capita incomes and high poverty rates when 
compared to the rest of the country, FDI is viewed by government officials in these states 
as an effective way to “improve the economic well-being of their citizens” (201-202).  
The government officials from the SEAC region are particularly targeting 
Japanese multinationals for FDI because “Japan is reemerging as the most important 
source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the United States. In 2013, Japanese firms 
were the largest source of new inflows of FDI into the United States for the first time 
since 1992, injecting almost $45 billion of fresh investment into the U.S. economy in that 
year alone.” Within the industries attracting Japanese FDI, “motor vehicles are the single 
largest industry” (Moran, 1-3). As a result, among the top six automotive companies in 
the United States, three are Japanese; Toyota, Honda, and Nissan (Thompson, 1). Their 
presence is particularly felt in the states that compose the SEAC. For example, Honda has 
a manufacturing plant in Alabama, Toyota has a plant in Mississippi, and Nissan has 
plants in both Mississippi and Tennessee.  
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Mississippi, the only state to host both Nissan and Toyota plants, has a strong 
business relationship with Japan. Junji Kurokawa, the chief executive director of the 
Japan External Trade Organization, speaking at the Japan-America Society of Mississippi 
(JASMIS)’s summer seminar in July of 2016, accentuated that “the major reasons why 
Japanese firms are drawn to the Magnolia state … are ‘cost competitiveness; vast extent 
of land, with room to grow; sophisticated infrastructure; customized incentives, and great 
hospitality.’” The president of JASMIS, Dr. Paul Tashiro, stated, ‘we have a very close, 
good working relationship with the Mississippi Development Authority and with 
Governor Phil Bryant and former Governor Haley Barbour’ (Bailey). These statements 
illustrate that Mississippi maintains a strong relationship with Japan to bring business and 
jobs to the state by providing incentives and tax concessions to Japanese companies in 
exchange. In particular, the Nissan plant in Canton, Madison County, Mississippi and the 
Toyota plant in Blue Springs, Union County, Mississippi are prime FDI outcomes of the 
collaboration between Mississippi and Japan that have been expected to have favorable 
impact on employment in Mississippi.  
 
Introduction to Cases of Nissan and Toyota in Mississippi 
Nissan 
In 2002, the government of Mississippi offered an incentive package worth $363 
million to Nissan in exchange for a promise of creating 5,300 new jobs with the 
construction of a plant in Canton, Madison County, Mississippi (Lyne) while the 
government of Mississippi, the government of Madison County, and the Mississippi 
Department of Transportation pooled funds for this package. The Mississippi state 
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legislature approved two tax rebates for Nissan, valued at $5,000 each for each direct job 
created, which would be rebated in the form of corporate income and personal income 
taxes. The rebates are scheduled to last 15 years (Peavy 9).  
State officials estimated Nissan would bring 16,212 direct and indirect jobs to 
Mississippi by 2005, and that the government would break even by 2007 (Lyne). 
Production at the plant commenced in 2003 at a 4.7 million square foot facility covering 
1,038 acres. The plant represents an investment of $3.2 billion by Nissan and has 
produced more than three million vehicles since it opened, with the capacity to house 
450,000 automobiles at one time. Nissan’s plant in Canton, which manufactures eight 
Nissan models, including the Nissan Altima and Nissan Murano, and employs more than 
6,400 people, has had no layoffs since it opened in 2003. Nissan’s annual payroll to 
employees at the plant totals more than $400 million, and the plant has donated $13.6 
million to charitable causes since 2003 (Nissan Fact Sheet). Nissan’s plant is diverse as 
its management team is comprised of 46 percent minority managers, whereas its 
workforce has 62 percent minority workers, with 60 percent of them being African-
American (Nissan).  
A common topic of discussion addressed within the local and international news 
is the Nissan plant in Canton’s unionization, or lack thereof. For example, the author of 
an article written in 2009 in the Jackson Free Press, titled “Why Foreign Businesses Dig 
Mississippi,” praises the plant’s “positive impact on job creation in and around the city of 
Jackson,” Mississippi’s capital, but also expresses concerns about Mississippi’s “dismal 
record regarding employee treatment, including wages.” The author points to the “United 
Auto Workers claim that the wages an employee at the Nissan plant in Canton makes, 
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compared to wages an employee at the Nissan plant in Tennessee makes, is an example 
of the state’s comparatively low pay,” citing a 2006 survey that suggests employees in 
Canton make around 20 percent less than employees at the Nissan plant in Smyra, 
Tennessee. However, Mississippi’s right to work laws and low wage labor are also 
considered a significant draw to businesses investing in the state because they are key 
reasons why the plant is located in Canton. If Nissan had selected another plant location 
outside of Mississippi, there would have been at least 6,400 less direct jobs in the state.  
Nissan is involved in a global auto alliance with Renault, a French auto-
manufacturer. Renault holds 43.3 percent of Nissan’s shares, while Nissan owns 15 
percent of Renault’s shares. The complexity of this alliance is increased by the fact that 
the French government owns 19.73 percent of Renault’s shares (Un Groupe Fort). French 
news articles convey the social concerns of the French government related to 
unionization, as it has taken it upon itself to monitor the labor relations of Nissan around 
the world. In Mississippi, French députés, or government representatives, have not been 
satisfied with Nissan’s local labor practices after conversing with employees from the 
plant in Canton and encouraging their unionization efforts. As a result of these 
conversations, 35 députés have recently sent a letter to Nissan’s senior leadership voicing 
their concerns about poor labor relations in this plant. In addition, representatives from 
the United Auto Workers union recently protested the non-unionization of the Canton 
Nissan plant at Renault’s headquarters in a suburb of Paris (Jannick).  
Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders and the actor Danny Glover organized a march 
to the plant on March 3rd, 2017 “to bring attention to what organizers call poor working 
conditions at Nissan’s manufacturing plant in Canton” (“Bernie Sanders”). The 
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organizers of the march claim that Nissan suppresses unionization at its Canton plant and 
does not sufficiently respect its workers, referring to the five citations received by the 
plant in the last five years from the Occupational Health and Safety Administration and 
the charges received from the National Labor Relations Board regarding the plant not 
allowing its workers to wear pro-union clothing (Parrish). However, so far Nissan has not 
taken action because it claims it is not breaking any American laws through their labor 
management practices. Specifically, Rodney Davis, the human resources director at the 
plant, claims that Nissan fully respects its workers’ unionization decisions. Since 
Mississippi’s right-to-work laws are one of the factors that attracted Nissan to Canton, it 
is being claimed its management members have actively discouraged employees from 
pursuing unionization. The unionization-related provision of Mississippi’s labor law, 
which requires that 30 percent of the workforce sign statements in favor of unionizing 
(Parrish) before initiating a popular vote of more than 50 percent of employees in favor 
(Maillard), attracts out-of-state companies because it hampers unionization, driving down 
costs. However, its unintended consequence is that it might have unfair effects, 
particularly on the African-American workers that make up the majority of employees at 
Nissan’s plant.  
An additional critique of the Nissan plant in Mississippi came from a report 
commissioned by the United Auto Workers. In this report, it was claimed that the 
subsidies provided to Nissan will end up totaling around $1.3 billion, well over the $363 
million figure that was publicized at the time of the plant’s fruition (A Good Deal for 
Mississippi). This report implies that government officials and the public were not fully 
informed of the cost and realistic employment effects of the plant in Canton. 
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Toyota 
 In 2007, Toyota announced it was constructing an assembly plant in Blue Springs, 
Mississippi, near Tupelo. The area hosting the plant is known as the PUL region, which is 
the acronym for the alliance among Pontotoc, Union, and Lee Counties. This alliance was 
created through state constitutional amendments to share the financial burden of hosting 
the plant. However, the plant itself is located in Union County. The Toyota plant in Blue 
Springs is somewhat of a special case (Jacobs), because inter-county collaboration was 
required to bring Toyota to the Tupelo area. Toyota received $293.9 million in incentives 
to bring 2,000 direct jobs to the region, in addition to 4,900 supplier jobs and another 
1,400 indirect jobs by 2013. Interestingly, the PUL region was not the highest bidder for 
the plant as Marion, Arkansas was willing to offer higher incentives, but Toyota preferred 
the site in Blue Springs because of its environmental sustainability due to its location 
away from the pollution coming from the city of Memphis and because of Marion’s 
flooding concerns stemming from its close proximity to the Mississippi River. When the 
plant was opened in the Fall of 2011, it was “projected that state and local governments 
would recoup their incentives investment and its related interest within 17 years” (Jacobs 
202-209). The plant that cost Toyota $961 million produces over 170,000 Toyota 
Corollas each year. Around 1,500 people are currently employed at the facility that is 
particularly “noted for environmental sustainability, such as efficient use of resources and 
materials and sending less waste to landfills” (Bailey).  
 The recent financial crisis heavily impacted the Toyota plant in Blue Springs. The 
plant was commissioned in 2007 but put on hold in 2008 when a recession hit the United 
States’ economy and car sales fell drastically until 2011, when production commenced at 
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the plant. In addition, the plant was originally going to produce Hylander SUVs, but that 
plan was changed when gas prices increased and demand for fuel efficient vehicles 
increased, leading to a second decision to produce Priuses at the plant instead, before the 
final decision to produce Corollas (“Toyota to restart”). These decisions show that the 
plant is susceptible to market fluctuations. Therefore, if there is another economic 
downturn or major increase in gas prices, it is likely the plant’s operations will adjust, 
indicating layoffs or plant closures are possible. 
Like the Nissan plant, the Toyota plant drew disapproval from the United Auto 
Workers because Toyota decided to close a plant in California and open this plant in 
Mississippi at around the same time. The United Auto Workers claimed this occurred 
because labor cost in Mississippi is lower, but Toyota refuted this claim stating the plant 
in California was closed because Toyota shared the space with General Motors, who 
decided to leave the plant first (“Toyota to restart”). However, Toyota has not received 
criticism to the extent that the Nissan plant has, probably because the plant opened after 
the financial crisis, at a time when any new jobs were celebrated. In addition, as the plant 
is much smaller than the Nissan plant in Canton, each worker receives more 
individualized attention. The plant uses innovative assembly line techniques that reduce 
the strain and stress on workers (Maynard), thus creating more favorable labor 
conditions. Also, the plant’s small size and location further away from the state’s capital 
has contributed to a lower level of interest in the plant. Finally, the plant has not received 
as much international attention because Toyota does not belong to an alliance involving a 
government as an actor like Nissan does.  
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Research Question and Methods 
The research question that I address in this thesis is, “Have the expected effects of 
FDI projects in Mississippi, particularly those of the Nissan plant in Canton and the 
Toyota plant in Blue Springs, been achieved in terms of job creation and economic 
payoff?” Given that both plants required years of planning and a significant financial 
commitment by local governments, it is of high communal and state interest to evaluate 
analytically whether the plants’ projected benefits have been realized years after they 
began operating in Mississippi. I conducted my analytical evaluation of the actual 
achieved benefits of these projects taking into consideration the time, effort, and financial 
investment that they required. Specifically, taking both the perspective of the local 
governments and that of Toyota and Nissan, I investigated and evaluated whether each of 
these projects lived up to their respective projected job creation expectations. 
The contribution of my analysis is not only unique and valuable but also of high 
social interest because the public discourse about the effects of the Nissan and Toyota 
plants as exemplary large-scale FDIs in Mississippi is generally polarized. On the one 
hand, it is widely acknowledged that these projects have brought thousands of new high-
skilled jobs to Mississippi, while, on the other hand, they also cost taxpayers hundreds of 
millions of dollars. The debate is also polarized whether the analysis should go beyond 
the direct cost-benefit analysis because it is possible that these projects have spurred 
related investment in infrastructure and education, thus not only attracting new FDI 
projects in Mississippi but also creating additional direct and indirect jobs. I take all of 
these into consideration in my analysis reported in this thesis.  
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For my analysis, I used county level data sourced from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics to see the level of employment in the counties where the plants are located 
before and after their openings, including employment percent growth over time. I also 
evaluated employment within the manufacturing industry in these counties, as well as 
average annual pay for all industries and the manufacturing industry in each of the 
counties where the plants are located, which I considered my treatment counties. I also 
examined neighboring counties that do not host an auto manufacturing plant as control 
groups, using the difference-in-difference method to calculate the gap between percent 
change in employment and average annual pay in my treatment counties and control 
counties. I additionally conducted an analysis of the data related to Mississippi’s tax 
revenue, expenditure, and state debt before and after these plants opened. I sourced this 
data using the Annual Survey of State Government Finances provided by the United 
States Census Bureau. I also researched available company performance reports related to 
the plants in Canton and Blue Springs. Based on my analysis, I was able to make 
inferences about the effectiveness of the government of Mississippi’s decision to offer 
significant incentives and tax concessions to Nissan and Toyota with the objective of 
attracting these FDI projects. 
The goal of this social scientific research is to determine the effectiveness of the 
state of Mississippi’s allocation of resources to these plants and to identify ways in which 
the government could better spend its tax dollars to better serve the Mississippi 
community. Following the leadership of Chancellor Jeff Vitter, the Croft Institute for 
International Studies, and the Sally McDonnell Barksdale Honors College to engage in 
research of community relevance, I have pursued this research opportunity with the goal 
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to develop and offer data-supported suggestions that may have relevant policy 
implications. Once my research is deposited into the University of Mississippi database, 
it will be available for access by the state of Mississippi’s constituents to make their own 
informed choices. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In this chapter, I discuss prominent studies written regarding the effects of FDI on 
a national level to determine what the widely-held conclusions are regarding the 
effectiveness of FDI. I specifically researched studies related to job creation and Japanese 
FDI to understand the government of Mississippi’s approach to investing in these 
projects. I also examine the consequences of FDI and opinions related to the effectiveness 
of offering incentives to attract FDI in order to evaluate Mississippi’s investments. I 
conclude my literature review by assessing existing studies on the Nissan and Toyota 
plants in Mississippi.  
 
Effects of FDI on a National Level  
 A review of research that has been conducted on Foreign Direct Investment and 
its positive and negative consequences on economies is provided in “Foreign Direct 
Investment: A Focused Literature Review” by Olafur Margeirsson. I referenced this work 
throughout my research to outline the commonly held beliefs regarding the effects of 
FDI, particularly its influence on economic growth, because I am evaluating whether 
Mississippi’s local economies are experiencing the effects of FDI from the Nissan and 
Toyota plants as would be expected based on the past studies of FDI outcomes.  
Margeirsson focuses his review on the two major forms of FDI; Horizontal FDI 
and Vertical FDI. Horizontal FDI, the most common type, occurs when a production 
facility is constructed to produce goods for the economy in which the plant is located, 
with the goal of bypassing trade barriers such as tariffs or quotas. In the case of Vertical 
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FDI, only one part of the production process occurs at the project site, while the output 
process is then transferred to another location, to take advantage of “international 
differences in price of inputs, such as labour.” Both forms of FDI engender economies-
of-scale and a more efficient use of resources by the firm making FDI. FDI is often 
undertaken to overcome trade barriers, as some companies find it cost effective to invest 
in a production facility in a foreign country rather than have to pay import tariffs (2-6). 
The Nissan and Toyota plants both fall into the category of Horizontal FDI because they 
overcome trade barriers of imposed quotas to produce for American consumers.    
In his review, Margeirsson finds that FDI has a positive effect on economic 
growth, but this support is weak because many studies produced mixed findings. 
Macroeconomic studies are more favorable towards FDI and its effect on economic 
growth than their microeconomic counterparts, and it has been found that economies with 
more developed financial systems benefit more from FDI than less developed economies. 
Because the United States has one of the most developed financial systems in the world, 
this is generally a relevant finding for Mississippi considering the importance it has 
placed on attracting FDI. Margeirsson’s review also found that FDI leads to positive 
technological spillovers, as multinational companies bring knowledge and technology to 
their host countries. Specifically, FDI increases local competition with the introduction of 
advanced products that contribute to innovation and an “improved allocation of 
resources” (7-9). In terms of job creation, “FDI is found to have a positive impact on 
employment levels,” and “wages in foreign-owned companies have been found to be 
higher than in domestic firms” (10). These factors all indicate that FDI contributes to 
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economic growth, particularly in the long term, thus indicating why the state of 
Mississippi would be willing to finance these projects.  
Some consequences of FDI, however, are not found as positive. One of the most 
common objections to FDI is centered on the topic of sovereignty. Foreign firms making 
FDI might aim to influence regulations and policies in their host countries, as they 
contribute locally to a large number of jobs. Therefore, local economies can become 
dependent on multinational companies making FDI, which leads to a loss of political 
sovereignty (11). An example of this dependence is the Nissan case where French 
députés are seeking to influence labor practices in Mississippi at the Nissan plant in 
Canton based on the French government’s ownership in Renault’s alliance with Nissan.  
Incentives and tax concessions are also considered a cost of FDI. In order to 
secure an FDI project, local governments must offer the foreign company incentives to 
make their location competitive and favorable. Margeirsson posits that “lower taxes seem 
to attract FDI… But the costs are high enough to make it questionable whether this 
strategy should be adopted.” He argues that it is better to improve systems that will 
benefit all industries, like infrastructure and education, than to spend a significant amount 
of money attracting one specific investment. He goes as far as to claim that incentives 
and concessions “can be fruitless or suboptimal” (12). For example, Mississippi spent 
hundreds of millions of dollars to bring Nissan and Toyota’s plants to the state in the 
form of incentives, but it is questionable whether or not the increase in income tax 
revenue resulting from an increase in employment created by the construction and 
production of these plants equals or exceeds the incentives paid to these two firms, 
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especially if the plants do not remain in Mississippi long term once their tax concessions 
expire.   
In Lucyna G. Kornecki’s article, “Inward FDI in the United States and Its Policy 
Context,” she provides a more nuanced look at FDI within just the United States, 
particularly in terms of the impact of the recent financial crisis. Although new FDI 
projects decreased by 50 percent from 2008 to 2009, the manufacturing industry was less 
affected, with FDI inflows only declining by 31 percent (5-6). This is relevant for the 
Toyota plant in Blue Springs that was commissioned in 2007, but was delayed due to the 
financial crisis, and did not become operational until 2011.  
Kornecki focuses on the scale of impact of FDI in the United States, especially in 
terms of the manufacturing industry. She found that over the last ten years FDI has led to 
the employment of 5-6 million workers, 2 million of those being manufacturing workers. 
In addition, “FDI-supported manufacturing jobs tend to be more stable during economic 
recessions than domestic manufacturing jobs,” and “workers at majority-owned U.S. 
affiliates of foreign companies receive 30 percent higher pay than those in non-FDI 
supported jobs” (7). Her findings are overwhelmingly positive regarding the impact of 
FDI on the economy and job creation, particularly for the manufacturing industry.  
Kornecki also discusses policy measures the United States government has 
undertaken to increase FDI. Specific policy actions have included entering into various 
investment agreements, like bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and double taxation 
treaties (DTTs). She refers to SelectUSA and the important initiatives of state and local 
governments and development agencies undertaken to facilitate investment in their region 
in conjunction with the Committee on Foreign Investment and the role it plays in 
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monitoring mergers and acquisitions “for any national security concerns.” This 
committee contributed to increasing investment by “reducing protectionist pressure that 
security concerns might otherwise generate,” and Kornecki believes the government 
should maintain the United States’ “open policy” toward FDI to take advantage of its 
benefits (8-9). In this regard, the state of Mississippi has cultivated relationships with 
Japanese organizations to foster new FDI projects, following the initiatives of 
SelectUSA.  
 
FDI and Job Creation 
 As the research focus of this thesis is to assess the effects of FDI in Mississippi on 
job creation, I focus my further literature review on studies related to job creation from 
FDI in the United States. Julian Richards and Elizabeth Schaefer of the Office of Trade 
and Economic Analysis at the Department of Commerce co-authored a report titled “Jobs 
Attributable to Foreign Direct Investment in the United States” in February of 2016. This 
report outlines the estimated total direct and indirect jobs in the United States resulting 
from FDI, including those spurred by productivity growth from technology spillovers. To 
generate their estimations, the authors used the United States Applied General 
Equilibrium (USAGE) model in which they removed all of the FDI from the U.S. 
economy and observed changes in employment levels. Their model incorporated “supply 
side constraints using price mechanisms and market clearing assumptions,” in addition to 
“interrelated changes in labor demand and supply, wages, capital investment, public 
expenditures and revenues, and exchange rates and change” (2-3).  
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 Richards and Schaefer found that FDI provides 6.1 million direct jobs and 2.4 
million indirect jobs, totaling 8.5 million jobs (Executive Summary), which equals six 
percent of total employment and 5.7 percent of GDP in the United States (7).  They also 
applied their model to specific manufacturing sectors. Within the motor vehicles, bodies 
and trailers, and parts sector, they found that FDI accounts for 369,000 jobs, or 44.6 
percent of total jobs in the sector. As this percentage is the largest among all 
manufacturing sectors (5), it means that the motor vehicles manufacturing sector relies 
heavily on FDI for employment.  
 Richards and Schaefer next applied their model to estimate the number of jobs 
attributable to an increase in production related to technology spillovers from FDI. They 
found that in the manufacturing sector alone, over the last 26 years, another 3.5 million 
jobs can be attributed to FDI when technology spillovers are included, or 2.5 percent of 
employment and 2.9 percent of GDP. Therefore, Richards and Schaefer inferred that “12 
million people have jobs in the U.S. due to either direct employment at foreign firms, 
indirect and induced employment, or productivity spillovers” (13).  
 In 2012, Beata S. Javorcik produced a report for the World Bank titled “Does FDI 
Bring Good Jobs to Host Countries?” in which she emphasized that “jobs created by FDI 
are good jobs, both from the worker’s and the country’s perspective.” She asserts that 
jobs at foreign firms are likely to pay higher than jobs at their domestic counterparts, in 
part because they are more willing to offer training to their workers. This is important 
from the government’s perspective because it implies that FDI is associated with 
increased productivity related to better competition and knowledge spillovers (25-26).  
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 Javorcik states that because of the “positive externalities associated with FDI … a 
government intervention aimed at increasing FDI inflows may be warranted.” However, 
like Margeirsson, she also cautions governments to provide incentives and concessions, 
because “it is difficult to ensure that a foreign affiliate that is awarded FDI incentives will 
remain in operation for a sufficient number of years to warrant the subsidy” (26). She 
instead encourages governments to spend more money promoting their locations to 
attract investments. Overall, she is positive about the potential for the job creation and 
economic growth prompted by FDI, which is supportive for Mississippi’s efforts to 
attract FDI to primarily create jobs.  
 
Japanese FDI in the United States  
Japanese outward foreign direct investment was spurred in the late 1980s by an 
appreciation of the yen, with the United States as its primary destination. Japanese FDI 
was “concentrated in the automobile, steel, and electronics industries,” as it “was 
motivated largely by a desire to maintain access to the U.S. market in the face of actual or 
prospective trade restrictions.” Over time, Japan has transferred a significant amount of 
technology to the United States, particularly in the manufacturing industry. “The 
technology transferred has mainly taken the form of superior methods of managing 
manufacturing and other process technologies … In the automobile industry, which has 
been the most extensively studied, U.S. manufacturing has benefitted from the 
implementation of manufacturing process management techniques developed in Japan” 
(Chapter 13). Specifically, the imitation of processes by domestic firms contributed to an 
increase in competition which spurred innovation in the United States.  
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Japanese investment continues to benefit the United States economy in several 
ways. In 2012, Japanese-owned firms “contributed $93 billion in value added to the U.S. 
economy.” A large share of Japanese companies’ contributions took the forms of paid 
wages and stimulated research and development (R&D) activity. In 2012, American 
workers at Japanese firms made on average $80,000 a year in terms of wages and 
benefits, which is significantly above the U.S. average. As wages at Japanese firms are 
also higher on average than at FDIs from other foreign countries, Japanese companies are 
viewed as “exceptional contributors to creating highly paying jobs in the U.S. economy.” 
In addition, Japanese firms in the United States spent $10,260 per worker on R&D, 
roughly $2,000 more than the average for other foreign firms (Oldenski 2). In other 
words, Japanese firms have demonstrated a commitment to their American employees by 
paying them high wages and allocating a significant amount of resources to R&D.  
Japanese automobile manufacturing is a prominent category within Japanese FDI 
in the United States. Japanese auto companies invested $35 billion in 2012 and $41 
billion in 2013 to produce 3.2 million and 3.6 million cars and trucks, respectively, while 
they bought $51 billion in 2012 and $57 billion in 2013 worth of U.S. auto parts (8). In 
2017, employment of Japanese auto companies exceeds 80,000 workers, which includes 
60,000 manufacturing workers and 4,000 research engineers and scientists at 26 
manufacturing plants and 36 research facilities (8), and accounts for a large number of 
high paying jobs for American workers. These numbers do not include employment in 
the dealer network of Japanese automobile companies, that employs more than 375,000 
workers. In 2015, “more than 1.5 million U.S. jobs [were] supported by the Japanese-
brand automobile companies … [generating] over $106 billion in worker compensation, 
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which in turn results in more than $16 billion in personal income taxes to the federal 
government.” In addition, the Japanese automobile industry in the United States has 
continued to grow, with direct employment increasing by 20.8 percent since 2011 (Prusa, 
Executive Summary). This growth has exhibited an unprecedented rate because total 
employment by Japanese firms, including indirect jobs generated by these companies, has 
increased 17 percent since 2011, while overall employment in the U.S. economy has only 
grown 7 percent (12). Moreover, total compensation paid by Japanese firms has increased 
33.9 percent since 2011, which is “more than twice the growth in compensation for all 
U.S. workers” (13).  As the manufacturing industry, including automobile manufacturing, 
is an important gauge of the U.S. economy as a whole, “the performance and growth [of 
the Japanese-brand automobile producers] are important indicators for the overall U.S. 
economy” (3). 
The above data provide evidence that Japanese firms are high paying employers 
of thousands of American workers, contributing significantly to the overall U.S. 
economy. This indicates that Mississippi’s partnership with Japan is a strength of 
Mississippi’s economy, and the fact that Mississippi is the home of two major Japanese 
auto-manufacturing plants signals the existence of high paying and stable manufacturing 
jobs in the state.  
 
Employment Impact of Motor Vehicle Plants 
 Beyond having direct employment impact, the FDI projects of auto manufacturing 
plants, such as the Nissan and Toyota plants, are believed to have the potential to 
contribute to a large increase in indirect employment. Brian Adams from California State 
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University, East Bay authored a study in October of 2015 that examines the indirect jobs 
created by motor vehicle assembly plants. He states that policymakers commonly justify 
the large amount of concessions they pay to auto manufacturers with the belief that many 
indirect jobs will be created through the construction of these plants. His study, like mine, 
aims to examine if the estimations of the indirect employment from plant openings by 
local governments are correct. For this examination, he “compares the employment gains 
in regions that landed assembly plants with those in comparable regions that did not” (3). 
I attempt to perform the same examination in my study by including an assessment of 
employment levels in counties surrounding the counties where the Nissan and Toyota 
plants are located. My goal is to evaluate if the counties’ investments paid off in 
comparison to neighboring counties that may benefit from the plant but did not 
necessarily have to pay for it. In contrast, Adams selected counties that were named by 
auto manufacturing companies as finalists for manufacturing plants but did not end up 
receiving one for his control group.  
 Adams finds that indirect jobs from parts suppliers do increase with the 
construction of an assembly plant, but not on a significant scale. Five years after a plant 
opened, only 500 parts supplier jobs have been created on average, while direct 
employment from the plant outnumbers indirect employment by a significant amount. He 
claims that indirect employment may continue to grow long term, but it is not guaranteed 
that plants will remain in one location for a long time. Therefore, so policymakers should 
pause before “dispersing hundreds of millions of dollars in subsidies” (30). In line with 
the other studies reviewed in this thesis, Adams cautions governments to be more 
conservative when providing incentives and concessions, because estimations of indirect 
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employment stemming from the plants are overly high and optimistic. As a result, 
governments will not receive the return on investment that they predicted. In my study, I 
assess whether or not the government of Mississippi’s indirect job projections were too 
high, as indicated in Adams’ study.  
 
Existing Studies on Nissan and Toyota in Mississippi 
 To my best knowledge, only two past studies examined the economic impact of 
the Nissan plant in Canton or the Toyota plant in Blue Springs, and both of those studies 
examined only the Nissan plant in Canton. The first study was developed by Mississippi 
State University and the National Strategic Planning and Analysis Research Center in 
collaboration with Nissan. The study is publically available as it is displayed on Nissan’s 
website. Using Regional Economic Models Inc. (REMI), the authors of the study find 
that Nissan has created 25,000 jobs in Mississippi contributing 2.9 billion to state GDP 
each year. The researchers also compare median family income, poverty rate, and 
unemployment rate, in addition to a few other measures, in Madison County with 
neighboring counties, but they do not show how these figures changed over time taking 
into account the time period before the plant opened (Nissan Canton). As Brian Adams 
claims that these models generally over-estimate the indirect employment resulting from 
motor vehicle assembly plants, and, as the study was funded by Nissan, it is possible that 
the figure of 25,000 created jobs is inflated. This study does not mention the incentives 
provided to Nissan for choosing its location in Madison County.  
 The second study is reported in the doctoral dissertation deposited at the 
University of Mississippi by John Patrick Peavy in 2007. This researcher uses the Nissan 
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plant in Canton to compare two economic impact models. He uses an input-output 
analysis model and a relative employment density model to estimate the employment 
impact of the Nissan plant, with the relative employment density model taking into 
account job displacement to estimate a net employment effect (Peavy, 1). The REMI 
model used in the study cited previously is an example of an input-output analysis model.  
 The input-output analysis model Peavy discusses in his dissertation produces a 
number, referred to as a multiplier, that is multiplied by the number of direct jobs to 
estimate the number of total jobs produced by the plant. The input-output analysis model 
Peavy found most credible produced a 4.0 multiplier, suggesting that the total 
employment effect of the Nissan plant in Canton is 17,108 jobs from 4,277 direct jobs 
created by the plant in 2004 (29).  
 Peavy also used a relative employment density model to estimate the employment 
effect of the Nissan plant, taking into consideration job displacement, or the number of 
jobs vacated by employees that took a job created by the new plant that were not refilled. 
Net employment is important because governments’ tax revenues are not affected by total 
employment gains but net employment gains (33). Peavy used employment density, or 
county employment divided by county square miles, as his dependent variable, to assess 
the employment effect of his several independent variables, including wages, 
infrastructure, and the Nissan plant. He applied a random effects econometric model and 
used a regression analysis to determine the effects of these variables on employment. 
Peavy found, using this model, that the net employment effect of the Nissan plant in 2004 
was only 4,062 jobs in the nine counties surrounding the plant, implying that a significant 
amount of jobs were displaced by the plant in the region (73). This model also estimated 
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the effects of other variables on employment in the same nine counties, including wages, 
schools, roads, education, and race, among other factors. Peavy found that “a county that 
spends money on human and physical capital realizes a significant increase in county-
level employment,” whereas the employment effect of the Nissan plant was below 
previous estimates. Therefore, Peavy raises the question that employment may be higher 
in Mississippi if resources had instead been spent on investments in human and physical 
capital (84).  
In summary, Peavy’s finding that input-output analysis models overestimate the 
employment effect of the Nissan plant is in accordance with the findings of other studies 
cited in this literature review. When job displacement is taken into account through the 
relative employment density model, the net employment effect of the Nissan plant is 
significantly lower than the estimates used by the state of Mississippi when it was 
planning and bidding for the plant. Peavy questions the effectiveness of the investment 
made in this FDI project by using his model to show that investments in human and 
physical capital can have more effect on employment than auto manufacturing FDI, and I 
find his study to be effective and convincing.  
My examination reported in this thesis is different from those reported in the 
above two studies as I examine how employment and wages in Madison County have 
changed since the Nissan plant opened in comparison to a neighboring county to assess 
the economic impact of the plant relative to Nissan’s expectations. I make the same 
examination of the Toyota plant in Union County to assess the effect of these Japanese 
auto manufacturing FDI projects in Mississippi on a state-wide level.  
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Summary of Literature Review 
 In summary, FDI produces millions of quality jobs for Americans. In addition, 
technology spillovers from foreign firms lead to more jobs and increased productivity in 
the United States economy. Japan is a prominent source of FDI in the United States as 
Japanese firms are high paying employers that invest heavily in research and 
development. However, the findings of past studies indicate that governments should be 
cautious when providing incentives and concessions to foreign firms because it is not 
clear whether or not they pay off, especially in light of the fact that estimations of indirect 
jobs resulting from the construction and operation of motor vehicle are often 
unrealistically high. For example, one independent study evaluating the economic impact 
of the Nissan plant found that the net employment impact of the Nissan plant did not 
meet expectations. Therefore, this study and other studies referenced in my literature 
review suggest that governments should consider investing in education and 
infrastructure instead of manufacturing FDI, because the payoffs are easier to discern and 
attract many industries instead of only one firm.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
 
Employment 
 
Nissan 
In 2002, Nissan promised to create 5,300 new jobs with their Mississippi plant 
opening in 2003. State officials estimated Nissan would bring 16,212 direct and indirect 
jobs to Mississippi by 2005. Table 1 [See Appendix] shows the change in employment in 
Madison County from 2001 to 2015 for all industries in Panel A, and separately for the 
manufacturing industry in Panel B. Change in employment for Rankin County, a county 
neighboring Madison County, is also shown. I used Rankin County as a control group 
because it did not receive the Nissan plant, which I am considering the treatment, and it 
therefore can be instrumental to better assess the impact of the Nissan plant in Madison 
County. Between 2001 and 2002, before the Nissan plant opened, employment in 
Madison County only grew by 4.95 percent, while employment in Rankin County grew 
by 2.32 percent. These numbers show that before the Nissan plant opened, these two 
neighboring counties experienced similar employment growth with Madison County 
outperforming Rankin County by only 2.72 percentage points.  
This changed after the Nissan plant opened in 2003. While the growth of 
employment in Rankin County remained relatively stable with an increase in employment 
by 2.86 percent between 2002 and 2003, Madison County experienced a 21.11 percent 
increase in employment from 2002 to 2003. As a result, Madison County’s employment 
growth between 2002 and 2003 was 18.25 percentage points higher than employment 
growth in Rankin County over the same period.  
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Employment in Madison County continued to grow after 2003, and by 2015 there 
were 52,401 employees in Madison County, a 48.5 percent increase. During the same 
time period, employment in Rankin County grew 27.46 percent, which is 21.04 
percentage points below employment growth in Madison County.  
Between 2002 and 2005, there was an increase in employment in Madison County 
of 12,432 jobs, though this net increase does not reach the estimate that the plant would 
create 16,212 total jobs by 2005. This discrepancy could be accounted for by other 
companies leaving the county or downsizing during that time frame, which reflects a job 
displacement. 
A sustained growth in employment with the introduction of the Nissan plant in 
Canton is also shown within the manufacturing industry. As reported in Panel B of Table 
1, Manufacturing employment in Madison County nearly doubled from 2002 to 2003 to 
6,129 workers, or an 82.96 percent increase. Manufacturing employment in Madison 
County peaked in 2005 with 9,054 employees, but has remained much higher than pre-
plant levels at 8,627 in 2015.  
In comparison, manufacturing employment in Rankin County had been 
decreasing before 2003 and continued to decrease after 2003. As a result, manufacturing 
employment growth in Madison County was 25.87 percentage points higher between 
2001 and 2002, and the gap increased substantially to 96.67 percentage points between 
2002 and 2003. Manufacturing employment in Rankin County decreased from 5,055 to 
4,515 from 2002 to 2003, and this figure has remained thereafter below 5,000. While 
manufacturing employment in Madison County has remained much higher relative to 
pre-2003 levels since the plant opened, manufacturing employment in Rankin County has 
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steadily declined. This difference shows the Nissan plant has had a greatly positive effect 
on employment in Madison County because the employment trend in Madison County 
would have likely followed that of Rankin County if the plant had not been constructed. 
Overall, the employment projections of the Nissan plant have largely been met, as 
evidenced by an increase in employment in Madison County from 29,136 in 2002 to 
52,401 in 2015. However, it is not possible to determine the exact number of those new 
jobs that are indirectly related to the operation of the Nissan plant. From 2003, or after 
the plant opened, to 2015, employment increased 48.5 percent, indicating the creation of 
jobs in Madison County indirectly related to the Nissan plant. Employment within the 
manufacturing industry in Madison County increased by 5,277 from 2002 to 2015, and 
this increase can be explained by the current number of employees at the Nissan plant, 
6,400, but does not reflect any indirect growth (Nissan). However, other manufacturing 
jobs have left the county during this period, as there is a gap.  
 Table 1 also allows for comparison between employment growth in Madison 
County and the state of Mississippi overall. While overall employment and employment 
in manufacturing was growing rapidly in Madison County, the situation was quite 
different in the rest of the state. Overall employment in Mississippi increased by only 1.6 
percent between 2003, when the Nissan plant opened, and 2015. This increase was 46.9 
percentage points lower than the increase in employment in Madison County during that 
period. In addition, between 2003 and 2015, Mississippi lost almost 20 percent of its 
manufacturing jobs, while Madison County gained over 40 percent of manufacturing 
jobs.  
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Toyota 
Toyota promised to bring 2,000 direct jobs to the PUL region, which is composed 
of Pontotoc, Union, and Lee Counties, in addition to 4,900 supplier jobs and another 
1,400 indirect jobs by 2013 with the construction of their plant in Blue Springs, Union 
County, Mississippi. Table 2 [See Appendix] shows employment figures for the PUL 
region from 2009 to 2015, with all industries shown in Panel A and only the 
manufacturing industry shown in Panel B. Union County is the treatment county and 
Pontotoc and Lee Counties are used as control counties. Before the plant opened, 
employment was decreasing in Union County, with a negative percent change of 5.7 
percent from 2009 to 2010. Employment was increasing slightly in Pontotoc and Lee 
Counties, with growth of 4.24 percent and 1.67 percent respectively. 
This employment pattern changed, however, when the plant opened in 2011 and 
Union County experienced a significant growth in employment at 12.66 percent between 
2010 and 2011, while employment growth slowed in both Pontotoc and Lee Counties, at 
1.43 percent and 1.2 percent respectively. Between 2011 and 2015, employment grew in 
Union County by 13.89 percent, whereas employment grew by 14.12 percent in Pontotoc 
County during the same period, showing that there was not a significant amount of 
indirect jobs created in Union County after the plant opened that can be attributed to it.  
There was an increase in employment of 1,736 between 2010 and 2011 between 
the three counties, bringing the total employment in 2011 to 68,718. 1,000 of these 1,736 
jobs were added in Union County, where Blue Springs and the Toyota plant are located. 
In 2013, the year in which estimations were supposed to be met, total employment from 
the three counties was 71,751, so employment increased by 4,769 from 2010 to 2013. 
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This number does not reach the estimate that 8,300 direct and indirect jobs would be 
created by the construction and opening of the plant, indicating that estimations were too 
high or there was significant job displacement.   
Panel B shows growth in employment in the manufacturing industry in Union, 
Pontotoc, and Lee counties between 2009 and 2015. Before the plant opened, 
manufacturing employment in Union County had decreased by 13.02 percent from 2009 
to 2010, and it grew 8.77 percent in Pontotoc County and 0.72 percent in Lee County. 
However, between 2010 and 2011, the year the plant opened, Union County’s 
manufacturing employment grew 41.56 percent, Pontotoc County’s grew 1.4 percent, 
while Lee County’s manufacturing employment increased by only 0.3 percent. These 
numbers show that the plant had a significant impact on manufacturing employment in 
Union County.  
Manufacturing employment continued to increase in Union County between 2011 
and 2015, with growth of 23.55 percent. This growth is 10.92 percentage points higher 
than growth in Pontotoc County and 23.55 percentage points higher than growth in Lee 
County during this time. Lee County lost nine manufacturing jobs between 2011 and 
2015.   
Manufacturing employment increased by 1,982 over the three counties from 2010 
to 2013. This increase corresponds to the projection that 2,000 direct jobs would be 
created by the plant by 2013. However, if the indirect job creation projection was correct, 
one would expect to see higher job creation overall. Again, it is likely other 
manufacturing jobs left the region during this time. Although the three counties shared 
the costs of the plant, Union County reaped the vast majority of the benefits because, 
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without the plant, Union County could have also seen its employment remain steady like 
Pontotoc and Lee Counties, instead of its significant growth. It is unlikely the indirect 
jobs, which the plant was expected to create, were realized, as net employment did not 
grow to a level that would signify a large increase in employment at the level that was 
projected by 2013, which is the year when estimates were expected to be met.  
I would like to reiterate that the treatment county’s employment grew 
significantly more than the state of Mississippi’s. Across all industries and the 
manufacturing industry, employment growth in Union County has been much higher, 
with a difference of 40.67 percentage points within the manufacturing industry from 2010 
to 2011. Manufacturing employment has fallen noticeably in Mississippi since the turn of 
the century, in contrast to the growth in Madison and Union counties. Manufacturing 
employment in Mississippi has decreased by 48,000 since 2001, falling from 191,600 in 
2001 to 143,600 in 2016. The employment effects of the Nissan and Toyota plants have 
not been substantial statewide when compared to this large decline.  
 
Wages 
Nissan 
Table 3 [See Appendix] shows changes in average annual pay for all industries; 
Panel A, and the manufacturing industry; Panel B, in Madison County and Rankin 
County from 2001 to 2015. Before the plant opened, average annual pay in Rankin 
County had been higher than pay in Madison County for all industries and the 
manufacturing industry. With the opening of the Nissan plant in 2003, average annual 
manufacturing pay in Madison County increased 17.08 percent, compared to an increase 
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of 6.14 percent in Rankin County; a difference of 10.94 percentage points. This 
difference grew to 24.92 percentage points within the manufacturing industry between 
2003 and 2015. Although Rankin County’s manufacturing professionals were averaging a 
higher pay than Madison County’s in 2002, this gap was bridged and overcome the year 
the plant opened. The roughly $5,000 jump between 2002 and 2003 in average annual 
pay for manufacturing professionals in Madison County shows that the plant’s new jobs 
were higher paying than those that already existed in both counties.  
In 2015, the average annual manufacturing wage in Madison County amounted to 
$14,198 more than the all industry average, $8,702 more than the manufacturing average 
in Rankin County, and $10,275 more than the statewide manufacturing average. 
Therefore, the opening of the Nissan plant in Canton marked the beginning of a trend in 
which the wages of manufacturing professionals in Madison County increased at a rate 
faster than the wages of other professionals. This trend also indicates the creation of 
higher level manufacturing jobs stemming from the opening of the Nissan plant in 
comparison to manufacturing jobs that existed previously.  
 
Toyota 
Table 4 [See Appendix] shows changes in average annual pay across the PUL 
region between 2009 and 2010 for both all industries and the manufacturing industry. 
Before the plant opened, average annual pay in Union County had already been growing 
at a faster pace than in Pontotoc and Lee counties, at 2.7 percent for all industries and 
7.52 percent within the manufacturing industry, but average annual pay in Union County 
was still below Lee County’s and Mississippi’s averages in 2009. Average annual pay for 
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all industries increased over $3,000 the year the plant opened in Union County, or 10.33 
percent, and nearly $7,000 within the manufacturing industry, with 21.58 percent growth. 
This significant growth continued through 2015, and average annual pay in Union 
County for all industries and the manufacturing industry was the highest among the PUL 
region in 2015, in addition to being higher than statewide averages. 
As most of the employment growth from the plant occurred in Union County, this 
county has recorded the largest increase in average annual pay as well. The significant 
increase in annual pay of manufacturing professionals in Union County since the year 
when the Toyota plant began operation shows that the plant brought an influx of quality, 
high paying jobs that have been filled mostly by Union County residents.  
 
Nissan and Toyota Plant Performances 
 Press releases and the websites for each the Nissan and Toyota plants reflect a 
tone that is overwhelmingly positive. Each company’s press releases include numerous 
stories of the plants giving back to their communities through special events or charitable 
donations. Although it is not clear from pubic information whether or not the plants have 
reached their productivity goals, neither plant has either downsized or increased 
employment, thus remaining at about 6,400 and 2,000 employees, respectively. Nissan 
did not lay off any of its workers during the years of the financial crisis. There have been 
no public statements made from Nissan or Toyota signaling intent to move or close the 
plants, which is a good sign of their successful performance and which is reassuring for 
the Mississippi government and economy, especially because Nissan’s tax concessions 
are set to expire in 2018.  
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Related Government Revenue and Expenditure 
 In 2002, Mississippi’s total revenue amounted to $11,052,453,000, or $3,853.71 
per capita. However, total expenditure of $12,742,438,000 left the state with a 
$4,159,879,000 debt at the end of the fiscal year. Revenue and expenditure both 
increased in 2003, the year the Nissan plant opened, but revenue exceeded expenditure 
and Mississippi’s debt was reduced to $4,166,614,000.  
 In 2010, Mississippi’s total revenue was $20,978,857,000, which exceeded its 
total expenditure of $20,022,652,000. However, in 2010, debt at the end of the fiscal year 
reached $6,491,980,000. The majority of the increase in debt occurred during 2007 and 
2008, at the time period of the financial crisis. In 2011, total revenue was 
$23,441,796,000 and expenditure equaled $20,157,417,000. The year the Toyota plant 
opened, Mississippi’s revenue increased by roughly $2.5 billion, but expenditure 
increased by less than $150 million. Tax revenue increased, potentially to help pay off the 
debt that had been accrued during the financial crisis, but there was not a significant 
increase in expenditure. Therefore, it is difficult to assess a clear impact on Mississippi’s 
balance sheet made by the openings of the Nissan and Toyota plants and subsequent 
incentives paid by Mississippi to these companies, in part because they are most likely 
spread out over a long stretch of time, and the large increase in expenditure during the 
financial crisis largely masks an increase that would be seen resulting from the incentives 
paid to either Nissan or Toyota.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION 
Summary of Findings and Implications 
The findings of the studies covered in my literature review indicate that FDI is a 
source of millions of high paying and stable jobs in the United States, which are 
particularly salient within the manufacturing industry. Significant contributors of these 
FDI projects are Japanese firms, particularly Nissan and Toyota, which pay their 
employees high wages and invest in training, research, and development, while 
transferring their technological knowledge and manufacturing processes to their 
American subsidiaries. However, the reviewed studies have also found that the indirect 
employment estimations resulting from new automobile assembly plants are largely 
inflated, specifically, governments pay high incentives to these foreign firms to attract 
their investments without a clear sense of the benefits they could receive, especially 
because it is not known how long a plant will remain in its location, and what indirect 
employment growth will be because it can take several years to achieve. My analysis and 
the related findings reported in this thesis indicate that the Nissan and Toyota plants in 
Canton and Blue Springs respectively have had positive influence on employment and 
wages in the counties where they are located, but I found no indication that the indirect 
job creation stemming from the plants met expectations. Net employment within the 
manufacturing industry in Madison County increased by 5,277 from 2002 to 2015, and 
this figure increased 2,386 from 2010 to 2015 in the PUL region, showing a net increase 
close to the direct employment produced by the plants, but the absence of an increase that 
would be expected if there was a large growth in indirect employment from these plants, 
indicating job displacement. Average annual pay for manufacturing workers increased 
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roughly $5,000 the year the Nissan plant opened in Madison County and nearly $7,000 
the year the Toyota plant opened in Union County, signaling the creation of high paying 
jobs. There has not been a noticeable increase in Mississippi’s debt related to the 
concessions paid to these companies, though it may be masked by the debt accrued 
during the financial crisis, and current state debt would not be affected by tax 
concessions, because providing tax concessions only reduces potential future revenues. 
Since 2001, manufacturing employment in Mississippi has decreased by 48,000 
jobs. This decrease implies that the additions of the Nissan and Toyota plants have been 
unable to reverse the large-scale diminution of Mississippi’s manufacturing industry, and 
that the creation of indirect jobs through these plants cannot be determined exactly 
because other manufacturing jobs are leaving the state or disappearing altogether. In 
addition, the extent of the incentives and concessions paid to Nissan and Toyota cannot 
be discerned clearly, as reports vary greatly, sometimes claiming Mississippi is paying 
more to these companies than advertised before the plants’ construction. As Nissan and 
Toyota can decide to close the plants whenever they choose, the state of Mississippi must 
take into consideration the impact of negative international press relative to the Nissan 
plant and its non-unionization. The plant has also received a significant amount of 
attention nationally from protests led by high profile figures including Senator Bernie 
Sanders. This attention not only discourages other firms from investing in the state but 
also adds to the perception that Mississippi does not treat its workers fairly or perpetuates 
low manufacturing wages nationwide by spending millions of dollars attracting non-
unionized manufacturing plants with its right to work laws. This attention makes it more 
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challenging to justify the hundreds of millions of dollars Mississippi spent to bring the 
plants here because the expected benefits have not been fully realized. 
Conclusion 
The Nissan plant in Canton and the Toyota plant in Blue Springs contribute to 
their communities through charitable donations and investments in education in addition 
to providing stable, relatively high wages to their numerous employees, but some 
observers claim there are alternative ways to attract FDI without paying high incentives. 
They argue that investments should be made in education and infrastructure statewide to 
increase the skills of Mississippi’s workforce and improve its facilities, while money can 
then be spent networking with foreign firms to advertise Mississippi’s superior services, 
rather than allocating millions of dollars to outbid another region for a plant that will only 
serve one community and can leave whenever its owner decides. The fact that the PUL 
region was outbid and still received the Toyota plant shows that incentives and 
concessions are not the most important factors to firms when deciding where to locate 
their FDI assembly plants.  
Mississippi might consider attracting numerous industries other than 
manufacturing to the state, as the extreme decrease of employees in manufacturing 
sectors of Mississippi over the last 15 years has shown that the manufacturing industry 
does not have a promising future and that money spent to attract manufacturing jobs to 
Mississippi could be better spent on other, more promising industries. Overall, the Nissan 
plant in Canton and the Toyota plant in Blue Springs have had a positive impact on their 
local economies and have met expectations related to direct employment, but the same 
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does not apply to indirect employment related to these plants. Therefore, it is not clear 
whether the state of Mississippi has received the expected return on its investment in the 
form of an increase in revenue from income taxes to an extent that would cover the 
amount that has been paid in incentives and concessions. In the future, Mississippi might 
be better off investing in infrastructure, education, and advertising to attract FDI from 
knowledge-intensive industries rather than relying on bidding through the form of 
offering incentives and concessions to companies building manufacturing plants. 
Improvements in education and infrastructure could better serve the Mississippi 
community as a whole, and this should be taken into account when Mississippi is 
deciding next how to allocate its resources. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1: Changes in Employment, Nissan 
Panel A. All workers 
  Before plant opening After plant opening 
  2001 2002 
% Change 
2001-
2002 
Difference 
in % Change 2003 
% Change 
2002-
2003 
Difference 
in % 
Change 2015 
% Change 
2003-
2015 
Difference 
in % Change 
Madison 
County 
(Treatment) 27763 29136 4.95   35288 21.11   52401 48.5   
Rankin County 
(Control)  45709 46773 2.32 2.72 48112 2.86 18.25 61322 27.46 21.04 
Mississippi 1111255 1104255 -0.63 5.58 1096802 -0.67 21.78 1114379 1.6 46.9 
                      
Panel B. Manufacturing workers 
  Before plant opening After plant opening 
  2001 2002 
% Change 
2001-
2002 
Difference 
in % Change 2003 
% Change 
2002-
2003 
Difference  
in % 
Change 2015 
% Change 
2003-
2015 
Difference 
in % Change 
Madison 
County 
(Treatment) 2852 3350 17.46   6129 82.96   8627 40.76   
Rankin County 
(Control) 5814 5325 -8.41 25.87 4648 -12.71 95.67 4019 -13.53 54.29 
Mississippi 191600 182100 -4.96 22.42 179200 -1.59 84.55 143600 -19.87 60.63 
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Table 2: Changes in Employment, Toyota 
Panel A. All workers 
  Before plant opening After plant opening 
  2009 2010 
% 
Change 
2009-
2010 
Difference 
in % 
Change 2011 
% 
Change 
2010-
2011 
Difference 
in % 
Change 2015 
% 
Change 
2011-
2015 
Difference 
in % 
Change 
Union County 
(Treatment) 8379 7901 -5.7   8901 12.66   10137 13.89   
Pontotoc County 
(Control) 10275 10711 4.24 -9.94 10865 1.43 11.23 12399 14.12 -0.23 
Lee County 
(Control) 47575 48370 1.67 -7.37 48952 1.2 11.46 51702 5.61 8.28 
Mississippi 1081138 1074617 -0.6 -5.1 1076488 0.17 12.49 1114379 3.52 10.37 
                      
Panel B. Manufacturing workers 
  Before plant opening After plant opening 
  2009 2010 
% 
Change 
2009-
2010 
Difference 
in % 
Change 2011 
% 
Change 
2010-
2011 
Difference 
in % 
Change 2015 
% 
Change 
2011-
2015 
Difference 
in % 
Change 
Union County 
(Treatment) 2335 2031 -13.02   2875 41.56   3552 23.55   
Pontotoc County 
(Control) 5461 5940 8.77 -21.79 6023 1.4 40.16 6784 12.63 10.92 
Lee 
County (Control) 9899 9970 0.72 -13.74 10000 0.3 41.26 9991 0 23.55 
Mississippi 137700 134600 -2.25 -10.77 135800 0.89 40.67 143600 5.74 17.81 
47 
Table 3: Changes in Average Annual Pay, Nissan 
Panel A. All workers 
  Before plant opening After plant opening 
  2001 2002 
% Change 
2001-2002 
Difference in 
% Change 2003 
% Change 
2002-2003 
Difference 
in % 
Change 2015 
% Change 
2003-2015 
Difference in 
% Change 
Madison County 
(Treatment) 26802 27648 3.16   29225 5.7   42398 45.07   
Rankin County 
(Control)  27748 28138 1.41 1.75 29226 3.87 1.83 38310 31.08 13.99 
Mississippi 25923 26665 2.86 0.3 27591 3.47 2.23 37642 36.43 8.64 
                      
Panel B. Manufacturing workers 
  Before plant opening After plant opening 
  2001 2002 
% Change 
2001-2002 
Difference in 
% Change 2003 
% Change 
2002-2003 
Difference  
in % 
Change 2015 
% Change 
2003-2015 
Difference in 
% Change 
Madison County 
(Treatment) 26188 29487 12.6   34522 17.08   56587 63.92   
Rankin County 
(Control) 31425 32460 3.3 9.3 34452 6.14 10.94 47885 39 24.92 
Mississippi 29419 30384 3.28 9.32 31988 5.29 11.79 46312 44.78 19.14 
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Table 4: Changes in Average Annual Pay, Toyota 
Panel A. All workers 
  Before plant opening After plant opening 
  2009 2010 
% Change 
2009-2010 
Difference in 
% Change 2011 
% Change 
2010-2011 
Difference in 
% Change 2015 
% Change 
2011-2015 
Difference in 
% Change 
Union County 
(Treatment) 28912 29692 2.7   32760 10.33   38737 18.24   
Pontotoc 
County 
(Control) 28380 28673 1.03 1.67 29343 2.34 7.99 31859 8.57 9.67 
Lee County 
(Control) 34199 34414 0.63 2.07 34988 1.67 8.66 37182 6.27 11.97 
Mississippi 33847 34343 1.47 1.23 34976 1.84 8.49 37642 7.62 10.62 
                      
Panel B. Manufacturing workers 
  Before plant opening After plant opening 
  2009 2010 
% Change 
2009-2010 
Difference in 
% Change 2011 
% Change 
2010-2011 
Difference in 
% Change 2015 
% Change 
2011-2015 
Difference in 
% Change 
Union County 
(Treatment) 29313 31517 7.52   38319 21.58   49890 30.2   
Pontotoc 
County 
(Control) 28936 28986 0.17 7.35 30271 4.43 15.15 33478 10.59 19.61 
Lee County 
(Control) 37957 38105 0.39 7.13 38191 0.23 21.35 43506 13.92 16.28 
Mississippi 39568 40476 2.29 5.23 41816 3.31 18.27 46312 10.75 19.45 
 
Note: Source of data for all tables is the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages.  
 
